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INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND
STATE SOVEREIGNTY:
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IN THE
INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME

lNsoPPAK*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past decades, we have seen the global economic integration in
the world of international finance. In particular, financial markets have
witnessed a remarkable increase in the cross-border capital flows around
the globe. However, the impact of financial globalization has raised a
number of concerns in the wake of international financial turbulence.

In recent years, effects of financial globalization on state sovereignty
have been subject to critical scrutiny. Some people argue the process of
financial globalization propelled by the information revolution and
technological innovations has posed potential dangers to a countries'
ability to pursue national tax regimes generating revenue losses and
fiscal threats due to taxpayers' shifts in financial activities seeking crossborder tax arbitrage and lower tax jurisdictions.

* SJ.D. (Scientiae Juridicae Doctor) Candidate, Golden Gate University School of Law. I
owe immense encouragement and academic inspiration to Distinguished Professor of International
and Comparative Law Sompong Sucharitkul. Also, I am indebted to Law Professor Chris Okeke
and Finance Professor Hamid Shomali at Golden Gate University for academic guidance. In
addition, I greatly appreciate the dedicated and excellent research assistance provided by Nancy
Sheldon at Golden Gate University Law Library. Finally, I am grateful to the editors of the Annual
Survey ofInternational and Comparative Law. I am, of course, solely responsible for any remaining
errors.
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It may be argued that international cooperation to neutralize different tax

systems is necessary to enhance national and worldwide welfare.
However, others claim the process of financial globalization has fostered
the tax autonomy of a nation-state in providing a tax inducement to
attract business activities from another country to its jurisdiction.
Arguably, the increased mobility of capital has strengthened the state
sovereignty over national tax policy leading to international tax
competition.
At the center of the debate, this paper takes the position that the
relationship between financial globalization and national fiscal
sovereignty lies somewhere between the globalism that stresses
international tax harmonization and cooperation among national tax
authorities, and the realism that emphasizes the primacy of a nation-state
as a key driver behind international tax competition.
Given the close relationship between financial globalization and national
fiscal sovereignty, there is a strong need to examine the current
international tax regime. This paper begins with a description of
globalization and analyzes its nature and effects on the financial
environment. Implications of globalization for state sovereignty are also
addressed. In particular, global challenges to national fiscal sovereignty
are discussed. In this context, this writing clarifies the concept of tax
jurisdiction and reviews problems with the national tax systems such as
double taxation, and taxpayers' cross-border arbitrage which results from
the increased mobility of capital associated with financial globalization.
Furthermore, an emphasis has been given to discuss the pros and cons of
tax competition and harmonization.
More importantly, this article attempts to search for the measures to
enhance global governance in the international tax regime. In this regard,
an analysis of the network of tax treaties is provided. I then move on to
review the role of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) as a global tax network in international taxation.
In this context, an emphasis is placed on the evaluation of global network
governance conducted by independent decentralized government
agencies in the international economy under international law. In
addition, an argument about the creation of the International Tax
Organization (ITO) is discussed. Finally, this paper concludes by seeking
alternatives to enhance global tax governance through the coordination
of a bilateral tax treaty network and a global tax network in international
finance.
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II.

GLOBALIZATION AND THE FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT

A.

FINANCIAL INNOVATION

Globalization l is underway in various dimensions today more than ever.
Among the enormous challenges driven by the process, it is worth noting
that globalization propelled by the information revolution 2 and
technology innovations has brought about the increasing needs of crossborder relationships between countries. Remarkably, transborder flows
of financial information motivated by new computer based technologies
have grown up more rapidly than any other sector thus resulting in the
increasing interdependence among financial markets and market
participants both within and across national boundaries.
The global financial system has been evolving at ever-fast rates in the
past decades. Undeniably, the impact of globalization and the internet
has created the profound changes in the international financial services
industry. New technology has radically reduced the cost of borrowing
and lending across national borders facilitating the development of new
instruments and drawing in new players. 3
Indeed, computer and telecommunication technology has made it
possible to use the integrated system and programmes for conducting
highly complex financial transactions and for an immediate and systemic
exploitation of the flood of available information that may be of
relevance for financial operations. 4 The massive use of the Internet has
created not only a huge jump in transaction volumes but also the
utilization of highly complex financial innovations. The whole range of
ever more sophisticated derivative instruments 5 which are used to refine
I.
Globalization commonly refers to the erosion of geographical borders among nations in the
form of cross-border exchange of goods, services and information technology along with cultural
transfers. See Roman Terrill, W7zat does 'Globalization' mean? 9 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 217, 218 (1999). One observer describes globalization as "the interaction of national
economic systems." See Alan Greenspan, Opening Remarks for the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansa
City symposium on Global Economic Integration: Global Opportunities and Challenges (August 2426, 2000) at I
2.
The information revolution has raised the significance of the "back office operations"
supporting other business activities, which were formerly considered as mere "plumbing," but now
main operational process of business organizations seeking more profits. See Jane K. Winn,
Catalytic Impact of Information Technology on the New International Financial Architecture, 34
INT'L L. 137, 146 (2000).
3.
Alan Greenspan, Testimony before the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, US
House of Representatives (January 30, 1998) at I
4.
Mario Giovanoli, Virtual Money and the Global Financial Market: Challenges for
Lawyers, I Y.B. OF INT'L FIN. & ECON. L. 3, 16 (1996).
5.
A derivative is a financial instrument whose value is based on (derived from) other assets
or variable. Derivatives include options, swaps, and warrants. See generally Hal S. Scott & Philip A.
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further the allocation of instrument risk mostly traded in over the
counter6 markets. 7 As a result, electronic exchanges have been used
around the globe for traditional stock-exchange business and for futures 8
thanks in part to the specific programmes along with modern dataprocessing techniques.
However, the growth of global networked information systems poses
serious threats to the soundness of financial markets thus destabilizing
markets around the world because financial information can be
transmitted so quickly across borders. 9 It is argued that "excessive
computerization has also tended to deform the financial services industry
into a game driven by sheer lust for financial gain, without a broader
sense of self-discipline or concern for the overall welfare of the economy
or society."IO As a result, a good number of gullible investors in a scam
investment scheme can destabilize the safety of financial markets by
rushing in and out of the market based on misperceptions.lI
Undoubtedly, the global integration of information technology has
become a challenge to the participants of the financial markets. On the
one hand, financial services providers need to survive increasing
competition with competitors through the prudent management of risks
entailed by acting on the opportunities offered by new technologies. On
the other hand, regulatory and supervisory authorities should keep pace
with rapid financial innovation and make endeavors by striking an
appropriate balance in the midst of a rapidly changing market
environment since the evolution of the financial services industry driven
by technological advances is not likely to stop.
B.

FINANCIAL INTEGRATION

Over the past decades, financial markets have tended to become more
tightly linked across national boundaries. A notable example of capital
market linkages among the countries is the introduction of Euro along
Wellons, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION 921998 (5 th ed. 1998).
6.
Securities transactions are conducted through a telephone and computer network
connecting dealers in stocks and bonds rather than through an exchange. See id. at 800-801.
7.
Giovanoli, supra note 4.
8.
Futures are an agreement to buy or sell a fixed quantity of a particular commodity,
currency, or security for delivery at a fixed rate. Unlike an option, a future contract involves a
definite purchase or sale and not an unlimited loss. See generally Scott & Wellons, supra note 5.
9.
Winn, supra note 2, at 137.
10. Toyoo Gyoten, Global Financial Markets: The Past, The Future, and Public Policy, in
REGULATING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: ISSUES AND POLICIES 18
(Franklin R. Edwards et ai., eds., 1991).
11.
Winn, supra note 2, at 143.
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with the advent of EMU (European Monetary Union) which represents a
significant change since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in
1971 and the movement to floating exchange rates in 1973. 12
The EMU has eliminated exchange rate fluctuations among the eleven
participating countries and dramatically reducing interest spreads and the
volatility of the spreads. 13 The emergence of a unified money market for
liquidity with the rapid start of EMU has created a two-tiered structure.
The first tier includes the large banks in each domestic market which
compete for the European Central Bank (ECB) funds at auction and trade
liquidity among them effectively distributing liquidity throughout the
Euro area. These large banks operate as hubs for distributing liquidity to
a second-tier of smaller institutions in national markets. 14
As for emerging market economies, dramatic evidence of their linkage to
global financial markets was drawn during the Asian financial crisis
which was preceded by a massive surge in gross private capital flows to
emerging market countries and a deep compression of spreads for
emerging market borrowers. IS
For example, the five Asian crisis countries (Thailand, Malaysia, South
Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines) received $47.8 billion in foreign
bank loans in 1996. This capital inflow turned into a $29.9 billion
outflow in 1997, a turnaround of almost $80 billion. 16 Some argues that
these changes represent "a shift in tastes of global investors either toward
lower assessment of the risks of investing in [Asian] emerging markets

12.
Horst Koeler, The Euro·An Emblem Success and Challenges oj European Integration,
Remarks on the Occasion of the Informal Meeting of the ECOFIN Council (December 14,2001)
http://www.imf.org/externallnp/speechesl2001l12140I.htm; see also Bertold Wahlig, European
Monetary Law: The Transition to the Euro and the scope oj Lex Monetae, in INTERNATIONAL
MONET ARY LAW: ISSUES FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM Ch. 6 (Mario Giovanoli ed., 2000).
13. The participating countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain. All the European countries are expected to join the
EMU by 2010 under the condition that all goes well and the monetary union is prosperous. See
Robert Mundell, The Euro: How Important? 18 CATO J. 441,444 (Winter 1999).
14. International Monetary Fund, International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects, and
Key Policy Issues 13 (September 2000).
15. Michael Mussa, Factors Driving Global Economic Integration, the Federal Reserve Bank
of Kansas City symposium paper for Global Economic Integration: Global Opportunities and
Challenges 16-17 (August 25, 2000), at http://www.imf.org/externallnp/speechesl2000/082500.htm.
The Chart 5 in Mussa's paper illustrates the financing conditions for emerging markets between
1990 and 2000. According to Mussa's paper, factors driving global economic integration fall into
three categories: technological developments, social and individual for the benefits of globalization,
and public policy. He stresses that these factors have acted individually and interactively in driving
inte grati on.
16.
Martin N. Baily et aI., The Color oj Hot Money, 79 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, No.2
(MarchlApriI2000) at 101.
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or toward greater acceptance of such risks.'m Encouragingly, a recent
annual data on net private capital flows to emerging markets show that
net inflows stabilized in 1999 after large falls during 1997-1998. 18
With financial globalization, the international capital flows have
increased markedly in the 1990s. Some emphasize the need to determine
if there has been a genuine increase in financial market integration
because cross-border financial market linkages do not necessarily imply
a high degree of financial integration. 19 It is worth noting that according
to the causes of the increase in financial market integration the
evaluation of degree of financial integration may be variably different. In
short, this is because the welfare and policy implications of the apparent
higher linkages depend on whether they are the outcome of greater
market integration, fewer barriers to free financial trade in the context of
financial services liberalization or the globalization of information which
still entails barriers.20
Here, there is still a need to investigate the persuasive evidence of
growing international financial integration over the last decade. One
adopts two indicators to support the evidence. 21 The first indicator is the
sharp expansion in the scale of both gross and net capital flows between
industrial countries and between developed and emerging markets. 22
According to a balance-of-payments statistics, net inflows into emerging
economies rose from virtually zero in 1989 to reach $307 billion in 1996
before falling to half that level during 1997-1998.23

17.
Mussa, supra note 15, at 17.
18.
IMF, supra note 14, at 44-45 ("The stabilization of net private capital flows reflects
continuing growth in foreign direct investment and a recovery in portfolio investment, which more
than offset a continuing cutback in bank lending."). According to the report, net capital inflows to
five Asian crisis countries have been broadly unchanged from 1998.
19. Juan Ayuso & Roberto Blanco, Has financial market integration increased during the
1990s?, BIS Conference Papers No.8 (March 2000), International Financial Markets and the
Implications for Monetary and Financial Stability, at 175-195. Ayuso and Blanco focus on stock
markets and compute direct measures of the changes in market integration in 1990s. They argue that
the main driving factor behind the increase in financial market linkages is the information
globalization that affects financial prices rather than a higher degree of market integration.
20.
See id. at 192.
21.
William R. White, Evolving International Financial Markets: Some Implications for
Central Banks, BIS Working Papers No. 66 (April 1999) at 2.
22.
For the features of net and gross flows of capital, see International Monetary Fund,
International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects, and Key Policy Issues (August 2001) at 6-7
("Although net capital flows provide useful insights about balance-of-payments financing and net
funding requirements, they can considerably understate the volume and volatility of international
portfolio rebalancing. Gross flows more closely reflect international transactions and are more
relevant in terms of their impact on market prices and volatility.").
23.
The Institute of International Finance, Inc., Near-Term Prospects for Emerging Market
Economies (October 1998).
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Although the financial crisis has subdued the economic growth in
emerging economies and private capital flows to these markets net
capital inflows are expected to be about $160 billion in 2002 which is a
significant increase from the $80.5 billion in 1999 and the $130 billion
seen last year but well below the levels of the mid-1990s. 24 Nevertheless,
gross capital inflows have risen sharply to about six times the level of net
flows on a global basis since the mid-1980s. 25 As such, the growing
global financial integration has been seen despite financial crisis over the
decades.
In the meantime it should be recognized that before strengthening the
domestic financial system the increase in the volume and volatility of
international capital flows driven by the capital account liberalization in
light of financial liberalization has been a factor behind the recent costly
financial crises. 26 However, some argue that financial globalization along
with international financial integration will eventually reduce the
possibility of a financial crisis since it is associated with increasing direct
investment, which is not so risky as portfolio investment. 27
By contrast, one argues the recent financial crises have been caused
mainly by financial market liberalization and deregulation rather than the
global financial integration. 28 It is worth noting that the period between
1945 and 1973 was seemingly calm and prosperous since financial
markets were operated by a stable system of pegged exchange rates
under the Bretton Woods system, widespread controls over capital flows,
and strict restrictions on banking activities. 29 Arguably, the relaxing of

24.
IMF, supra note 14, at 46; see also IIF, Integrated Approach Proposed for a New Phase of
Crisis Prevention and Crisis Management to Revive Emerging Market Capital Flows, IIF Press
Release (April 9, 2002).
25.
IMF, supra note 22, at 7 ("The high level of gross flows relative to net flows suggests that
countries and regions that have small net capital flows can nevertheless experience substantial gross
inflows and outflows of capital.").
26.
Barry Eichengreen et al., Liberalizing Capital Movements: Some Analytical Issues, IMF
Economic Issues No.17 (Feb. 1999) ("It is not financial liberalization that is at the root of the
problem but rather weak management in the financial sector and inadequate supervision and
regulation, whose consequences are magnified by liberalization.").
27.
Paul Krugman, Crises: The Price of Globalization, the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City symposium paper for Global Economic Integration: Global Opportunities and Challenges (Aug.
24-26, 2000) at 104. He stresses although the process of globalization increased the risk of financial
crisis, the increase in trade as tradeoffs of the policies reducing the risk of financial crisis via costly
restrictions on capital flows may lead to a reduced likelihood of financial crisis in the long run
because a depreciation of the currency is likely to have net explanatory effects with increased trade.
28.
Charles Goodhart, Commentary: Crisis: The Price of Globalization, the Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City symposium paper for Global Economic Integration: Global Opportunities and
Challenges (Aug. 24-26,2000) at 108.
29.
Id. at 107.
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these financial regulations after 1974 brought about not only economic
benefits but also potential risks of financial crisis. 3O
Another indicator of the increase in financial integration is the creation
of new financial markets and instruments to facilitate diverse
transactions around the world. 3 ! In particular, the offshore markets have
seen the rise of financial transactions in domestic currencies to be
conducted abroad although it is argued that the markets generated by the
providers inducement on the users, due to the financial regulatory
discrepancies and the differences in the investors perceptions of
markets 32 rather than the fair share of financial innovation. 33
Furthermore, new financial instruments and financing techniques have
rapidly developed and grown in response to the desire of market
participants over the last decades. The advent of asset securitization
which links banking markets with capital markets has spread to meet the
needs of financial market participants. This new method of financing
helps the financial institution or corporations (originators) transform their
illiquid financial assets into highly liquid securities to improve their
financial situation and liquidity.34
This new technique has been used to remodel all the assets such as home
mortgages, credit card debt, student loans, car loans and equipment
leases into asset-backed securities. As a result, credit has been expanded
to consumers and the liquidity or flexibility for lenders with the

30.
Goodhart stresses that there is a need to restructure the framework for regulating banking
and financial sector s to restrict volatile short-term capital flows rather than as direct control. Id. at
1l0.
3J.
White, supra note 2J.
32.
Movements of money from the national markets to offshore banking centers have been
motivated by four factors: the profit incentive, financial privacy and secrecy, tax benefits (tax
savings/avoidance), and protection of assets from lawsuits and other liabilities. See B. Chad
Bungard, Offshore Banking in the British Dependencies, 9 TOURO INT'L L. REV. 141, 143-145
(2001).
33.
Gunter Dufey & T. Chung, International Financial Markets: A Survey, in INT'L
ANANCE AND INVESTING 3-29 (R. Kuhn ed. 1990) cited in Scott & Wellons, supra note 4, at 7.
34.
Securitization refers to the process by means of which primary creditors (originators)
transfer a diversified, segregated illiquid income producing pool of assets (underlying assets) to a
third party (special purpose vehicle) to transform and restructure these underlying assts and sell them
into tradable equity or debt instruments. The means by which these transformation and restructuring
are accomplished include pooling, unbundling, repackaging and refinancing of existing financial
assets into securities or instruments that can be sold to and traded by investors in capital markets. See
Tamara Frankel, SECURITIZATION, STRUCTURED ANANCING, ANANCIAL ASSETS
POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES, Vol. I, 3 (1999). For example, a special purpose
vehicle (entity) purchases a pool of car loans from the creditor, using money it got by the sale of
securities that are collateralized by the loans. As a result, interest and principal payments on thecar
loans are used to pay interest and principal on the asset-backed notes.
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modulation for investors has been getting greater. 35 Likewise, derivative
instruments have developed to meet the market participants' needs to
repackage credit risk into discrete bundles thus increasing the debt
market liquidity together with the improvement of the participants'
balance sheets.
According to the recent data, at end of 2000 over-the-counter derivatives
markets comprise $95 trillion in notional principal and daily aggregate
global turnover rose to about $1.4 trillion. 36 As recognized, financial
derivatives have created considerable benefits by allowing investors to
unbundle and redistribute diverse risks such as foreign exchange, interest
rate, market and default risks thereby contributed to the improvement of
market liquidity and increase in the capacity of the financial system to
bear risk and intermediate capita1. 37
However, there is a concern that heavy reliance on new and innovative
financial techniques and instruments can cause a serious turbulence
resulting in financial panics and banking crisis. 38 Although securitization
can create several benefits in the financial market it also raises some
potential risks particularly to the banking system. Most importantly, a
financial institution may be in big trouble when the originator could not
achieve a true sale of the assets and recognize the incurred losses when
the assets cease to reform subsequently.39 Also, potential risks arise when
banks in pursuit of a favorable market reception for the securitized assets
may tend to sell off the highest quality assets despite their retention of
lower quality assets and thereby increase the average risk in the
remaining portfolio. 40
Securitization may also raise systemic risks leading to the increase in the
fragility of the financial system in both national and international
contexts as long as it reduces the proportion of financial assets and
liabilities held by banks in countries where the variable minimum reserve
requirement system control the central banks operation. 41 Furthermore,
various securitization plans have been introduced to reduce the third
35.
Diana B. Henriques, The Brick Stood Up Before. But Now?, The New York Times (Mar.
10,2002) at § 3, Page I, Column l.
36. IMF, supra note 22, at 30.
37.
IMF, supra note 14, at 79.
38.
[d. at 83.
39.
Basel Committee Report on Asset Transfers and Securitization (Sept. 1992) at 5.
40.
[d. at 6.
41.
Under the system, a country's central bank can control the domestic money supply by
raising or lowering the level of minimum reserves, which banks should maintain. The effectiveness
is reduced with the decrease in the overall level of assets and liabilities held by financial institutions.
[d. at 7.
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world debt42 which arose by the loaning of unprecedented sums of money
from commercial banks in industrial countries to developing nations of
the third world in the 1970s due to the increase in the reserves resulting
from an influx of oil-generated deposits by the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).43
As highlighted in the third world debt crisis of the 1980s, arguably
securitization plans may be inadequate measures of alleviating the debt
problem so far as the plans cannot address the debt nation's major
problem of simply having too much external debt to service in the near
or medium-term future. 44
Similarly, derivatives activities can cause the build up of financial
system fragilities and adverse market dynamics in some cases as
demonstrated in the recent events of near collapse of the U.S. hedge
fund, Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM),45 and the Enron
debacle46 in mature financial markets. The turbulence of the near-failure
42.
Mostly, these plans entail repackaging of debts into a negotiable instrument, such as bond,
which creditor banks may thereafter sell on the secondary markets to private investors. See Robert
Plehn, Securitization o/Third World Debt, 23 INT'L LAW, 161,162 (1989).
43.
Alfred J. Puchala, Jr., Securitizing the Third World Debt, 1989 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
137 (1989).
44.
It is argued what the debtor nations really need is for creators to forgive and write down a
portion of the debt until the situation stabilizes and only thereafter, should securitization of the debt
be considered. See David W. Leebron, First Things First: A comment on Securitizing Third World
Debt, 1989 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 173 (1989).
45.
Between January and September 1998, LTCM, one of the largest U.S. hedge funds and
most important market-makers and providers of liquidation in securities markets, lost almost 90
percent of its capital. By August 1998, with less than $5 billion of equity capital, LTCM had earned
a very highly valued counterparty status and highly leveraged trading positions through assembling
of a trading book that involved about 60,000 trades, including on-balance-sheet positions totaling
$125 billion and off-balance-sheet positions including about $1 trillion of notional OTC derivative
positions. In September 1998, the Federal Reserve determined that rapid liquidation of LTCM' s
trading positions and related positions of other market participants might raise a serious threat to
already unsettled international financial markets. As a consequence, the Federal Reserve facilitated a
private sector recapitalization to prevent the collapse of LTCM. See United States General
Accounting Office (GAO), Long-Term Capital Management: Regulators Need to Focus Greater
Attention on Systemic Risk, Doc. No. GAO/GGD-OO-03 (Oct. 29, 1998) at I, http:www.gao.gov;
see also IMF; supra note 14, at 85.
46.
Enron was the main dealer, market-maker, and liquidity provider in major segments of the
OTC energy derivatives markets, and at end-September 2001, its overall derivatives trading
liabilities stood at nearly $19 billion. However, its non-recurring charges amounted to $1.01 billion
for the third quarter of 200 I, and net income was reduced back to 1997 by $586 million, or 20%.
The collapse resulting from the aggressive use of accounting techniques to mask the Enron's
excessive leverage and weak earning caused important volatility in financial markets, and
considerable losses for market participants, which may lead to the risk of systemic consequences for
financial markets. The plummeting of Enron's shares and credit rating in October 2001 resulted in its
filing for bankruptcy in two months. Arguably, the Enron case raised three capital market issues:
inadequate oversight of financial activities of nonfinancial institutions, ineffective private market
discipline, disclosure, corporate governance and auditing, and misallocation of retirement savings.
See IMF, Global Financial Stability Report (March 2002) at 41-42. See also, John R. Emshwiller,
Rebecca Smith & Jonathan Weil, Enron Slashes Profits Since 1997 by 20%, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9,
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of LTCM in late 1998 was preceded by the accumulation of a complex
network of derivatives counterparty exposures, encompassing a high
degree of leverage in the major markets through late summer 1998 and
the adverse shift in market sentiment following the Russian crisis in midAugust 1998.47 In short, the near-collapse raised concerns that heavy
reliance on innovative financial techniques and undue reliance on
historical information got the market participants into serious trouble. 48
As such the virulence of the LTCM turbulence posed the risk of systemic
impact on global financial system and real economic activities.
Meanwhile, in late 2001 the collapse of Enron; a non-financial
institution, energy trading and distribution corporation highlighted the
uncertainties about the effective functioning of credit-risk transfer
vehic1es 49 used to hedge or take on credit exposures across markets and
sectors. 50 Even though these financial instruments and markets, which are
usually driven by regulatory arbitrage offer some benefits to the market
participants including non-traditional players, the complexity of financial
transactions and markets have posed new challenges to the market. 51 As
demonstrated in the Enron case, the vast use of derivatives by way of

2001, at A3; Enron Corporation, Press Release, Enron Reports Recurring Third Quarter Earnings of
$0.43 per Diluted Share; Reports Non·Recurring Charges of $1.01 Billion After-Tax; Reaffirms
Recurring Earnings Estimates of $1.80 for 2001 and $2.15 for 2002 and Expands Financial
Reporting (Oct. 16,2001)
www.enron.com/corp/pressroom/release/2001/ene!68-3QEarningsLtr.html.
47.
The Russian tunnoil due to Russia's devaluation and unilateral debt restructuring sparked a
broad-based reassessment and repricing of risk and large scale deleveraging and portfolio
rebalancing that cut across a range of global financial markets. See IMF, supra note 14, at 8S.
48.
The Russian crisis deprived the LTCM of its engaging in highly leveraged bets on the
historical interest rate spread between riskier debt instruments and US Treasury bonds, and thereby
drove investors' worldwide flight of high risk investments to safety. See Steve Lipin, Matt Murray &
Jacob M. Schleginger, Bailout Blues: How a Big Hedge Fund Marketed its Expertise And Shrouded
Its Risks, WALL ST. J., Sep. 2S, 1998, at AI.
49.
Notably, credit risk transfers can foster the efficiency and stability of credit markets overall
the allocation of capital with the growth of the markets by the separation of credit institution from
credit risk bearing. Also, they can reduce the concentration of credit risk in financial systems by
helping nonfinancial corporations take on the credit risks held by banks. Additionally, credit risk
transfers create the diversification of financial institutions' credit exposures across markets and
sectors, and facilitate the trading of credit risk, and thus, financial and nonfinancial institutions can
flexibly manage their credit exposures. Moreover, liquid credit risk transfer markets can enhance
price discovery and provide price information. See Global Financial Stability Report supra note 46,
at 38-39.
SO.
Id. at 41.
S1.
Arguably, there are some concerns about these instruments and markets. First, they reduce
transparency regarding the institutional distribution of credit risk and its concentration. Second, they
may create or magnify channels, which help credit events-associated distress spread across
institutions and markets. Third, these instruments are not seemingly regulated as well as banks, and
not necessarily have the experience required to price properly and manage these risks. Finally, the
mechanism of credit risk transfer augments the potential for mispricing and misallocation of capital
by adding the leveraged instruments to the total amount of credit. [d. at 39.
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credit risk transfers raised concerns over potential systemic risks. 52
Moreover, the Enron case called for "much greater transparency and the
increased completeness in the accounting treatment of derivatives"53
since it seemingly engaged in manipulative accounting transactions to
minimize financial statement losses and volatility, augmented profits and
avoided adding debt to the balance sheet. 54 At the time, there were no
requirements to disclose information about its risks to counterparties, nor
the market price conditions thus the derivatives activities have not been
regulated in spite of the size of the derivatives market, its complexities
and pivotal role in the energy markets under the 2000 Commodity
Futures Act. 55
Under the circumstances, the same financial techniques used for the asset
securitization were arguably applied to "construct the elaborately
camouflaged and booby trapped partnerships" resulting in the Enron's
collapse. 56 That is, the non-consolidated special purpose entities
(vehicles) were used to hedge certain Enron investments in its
manipulations. However, it should be recognized that the problem in the
Enron case is not the securitization, a process of creating asset-backed
securities but the more Enron-like uses of structured finance. 57 Arguably,
Enron's abuse of special purpose vehicles posed fundamental questions
whether its SPV transactions transferred risks of the hedged assets owned
by Enron to others 58 because of the SPVs' inability to perform their
hedges resulting from the simultaneous fall in Enron's asset and stock
values. 59 In this sense, the Enron collapse has not been caused directly by
52.
Allan Greenspan stresses that despite providing of greater flexibility to the financial
system, due to the complexity, the counterparties could get vulnerable to serious risk that "they do
not currently recognize, and hence these instruments potentially expose the overall system if
mistakes are large." See Allan Greenspan, Testimony before the Committee on Financial Services,
U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 27,2002) at 8.
53.
See id.
54.
As a consequence, the Enron's credit rating was damaged, and thus its credibility in energy
trading business was hurt. See Report of Investigation by the Special Investigation Committee of the
Board of Directors of Enron Corporation (Feb. I, 2002) at 4, 36, 68, 78, 97.
55.
Global Financial Stability Report, supra note 46, at 41. However, the U.S. Congressional
Hearings have affIrmed that certain energy derivatives activities do not fall into the categories that
are exempted from key regulatory provisions under the act.
56.
Henriques, supra note 35.
57.
[d. (quoting law professor Ronald Gilson that "Enron gives a very useful tool a bad name
for no reason. Structured finance is used for a zillion different and worthwhile purposes. The
problem is Enron used it to create a structure that was genuinely not transparent, to hide things.").
58.
Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron, and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in
Corporate Structures, 7 (July 2002), available at http://ssm.comlabstracCid=306820; see also
Henriques, supra note 35 (quoting law firm partner David Eisenberg that "securitization is about
transferring risk to others - and Enron only appeared to be doing that, when in reality they were
retaining the risk themselves").
59.
Steven L. Schwarcz, STRUCTURED FINANCE, A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
ASSET SECURITIZATION § I :1, at n. 41 (3 nl . ed. 2002).
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the new financial techniques and instruments but rather by a partly
ineffective private market discipline, disclosure, corporate governance,
and inadequate accounting rules should be blamed for the Enron case. 60
Consequently, any regulatory re-evaluation needs to keep in mind a longterm perspective so that market participants can take advantage of the
everlasting financial innovation in the age of the information economy.
Additionally, financial institutions need to strengthen credit risk
management practices to foster their review of new financial instruments.
Needless to say, the market participants' attention to the lessons from the
recent episodes and adoption of the adequate policies and controls will
substantially prevent or minimize the risks of repeating similar excess in
the near future. 61
C.

FINANCIAL DEREGULATION

As noted, financial regulators have responded to the evolution of
financial markets which are propelled by the competition among
financial service providers. However, the regulatory authorities are
continuously getting behind the structural changes in the financial
services industry and thereby react to immense pressures by relaxing the
financial regulations or implementing new regulations
Despite the regulators efforts, the increasing complexity of financial
services transactions involving the cross-institutional and cross-border
activities has reduced the effectiveness of financial regulation thus
eroding statutory and physical barriers between financial sectors and
jurisdictions which lead to regulatory changes and convergence of
financial regulatory standards in response to the regulatory arbitrage.
These structural trends have blurred traditional distinctions between
banking and other types of financial activities resulting in "one-stop"
shopping for the customers of the financial services industry and a
concentration of financial services in larger institutions through merges
and acquisitions. As such, there has been remarkable convergence of
banking and financial sectors.
The recent repealing of the Glass-Steagall Act (Section 20), which
prohibited banks from engaging in securities underwriting, under the
Financial Modernization Act of 1999 (the Gramme-Leach-Bliley Act) in

60.
Global Financial Stability Report, supra note 46, at 41.
61.
Richard Spillenkothen, Testimony before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Government Affairs, U.S. Senate 6 (Dec. 11,2002).
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the U.S.,62 and the dismantling of Japan's statutory separation of banks,
securities firms, and trust banks63 are examples of the new regulatory
approach to the structural trends.64
Moreover, international competitIOn between national regulatory
authorities based on regulatory discrepancies 65 has intensified the
pressure for deregulation of financial markets in the domestic arena. As a
result, the international pressures along with globalization of financial
markets spurred the domestic financial liberalization. 66 This competitive
deregulation and liberalization process have removed the anticompetitive regulatory restnctIOns, and brought the increased
competition for the financial market industry resulting in efficiency and
lowered costs in the financial services sector. 67 The financial market
participants enjoy net benefits from both lower prices for the financial
services and the improvements in quality and access to new financial
instruments through deregulation and liberalization. 68
In the meantime, there are some concerns about the potential risks and
other shortcomings raised by financial deregulation. 69 In short, the issues
fall into broad categories including financial market volatility, resulting
from the large swings in financial market prices, debt build-ups and asset
62.
Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. § 377 (repealed 1999); and Gramme-Leach-Bliley Act §
101 (a).
63.
In light of the financial "Big Bang," the Law Amending related laws for Financial System
Reform amended over 21 laws including the Securities and Exchange Law, Banking Law, and
Insurance Law (Law No. 107 of 1997). See Mamiko Yokoi-Arai, The Japanese Banking Crisis:
Some Historical and Regulatory Aspects, Y.B. OF INT'L FIN. & ECON. L., 205, 217 (1999).
64. At the extreme, the regulatory trends are toward the German-style "universal banking," in
which banks are allowed directly to underwrite securities and invest in equities of nonblank
institutions. See Richard J. Herring & Robert E. Litan, FINANCIAL REGULATION IN THE
GLOBAL REGULATION 10-11(1995).
65.
Differences in regulatory constraints between national financial systems have driven the
shift of financial activities from one location to another than to accomplish their intended goals in
some cases. See id. at 20. Such cases demonstrate that the regulators need to anticipate to the
providers' circumvention of the regulation through the financial innovation, and thereby react by
new regulation or deregulation. In particular, deregulation has played an important role in
stimulating financial innovation while innovation has spurred financial deregulation. In short,
financial innovation and regulation are mutually reinforcing.
66.
For example, Japan's financial liberalization in the early 1980s resulted from the United
States' pressures for Japan to make its financial services industry effective. See K. Osugi, Japan's
Experience of Financial Deregulation since 1984 in an International Perspective (BasIe: Bank for
International Settlements, Jan. 1990) cited in OECD, Regulatory Reform in the Financial Services
Industry: Where Have We Been? Where Are We Going?, FIN. MKT. TRENDS, No. 67 (June 1997)
at 36.
67.
OECD, supra note 57, at 53. While financial deregulation has created gains from efficient
resource allocation such as the improved capacity of consumers and private businesses to allocate
their spending over time thanks to increased capital mobility, it has also raised extensive changes in
the financial and macro-economic environment. Id. at 59-63.
68.
Id. at 56.
69.
Id. at 63-75.
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price bubbles preceded by flexibility of available financial instruments
and the increased access to credit, banking sector problems, and recent
international debt problems due to international capital flows.
However, it is argued that the costs and risks of deregulation can be
outweighed by its benefits if only deregulation is appropriately
implemented and entailed by necessary policy reforms affecting financial
incentives. 70 More importantly, the financial deregulation process should
be accompanied by proper reform efforts such as prudential supervision
and regulation of financial markets to ensure financial stability. In this
regard, the regulatory competition can focus on the quality of regulation
such as its ability to deliver results in terms of financial efficiency and
stability rather than the regulatory laxity.71

D.

CONVERGENCE OF GLOBAL STANDARDS

There have been some debates over whether the cross-national
convergence of regulatory policy is desirable by the pressure of
globalization. Arguably, globalization pushing the elimination of all
barriers and differences 72 among nations and cultures has brought sharing
same values accompanied by the convergence73 of economic and political
systems despite differences between countries with market economies. 74
In particular, the financial globalization has caused policy convergence, 75
a general convergence of policy goals, policy instruments, and policy
70.
/d. at 75.
71.
Wendy Dobson & Pierre Jacquet, FINANCIAL SERVICES LIBERALIZATION IN THE
WTO 112 (1998).
72.
However, some argue that globalization is misunderstood as "the promotion of
homogeneity across the face of the earth as a bulldozer. [Gllobalization is a technological and
telecommunications revolution, a phenomenon of the information age, which will not necessarily
erase all differences and barriers between nations and cultures." See Douglas M. Branson, The Very
Uncertain Prospect of "Global Convergence" in Corporate Governance, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
321, 326-327 (200 I).
73.
As for the meaning of convergence, one defines it as "the process of applying increasingly
similar rules to a given situation in different jurisdictions, and is closely related to the harmonization
and approximation of laws." See Andrew M. Whittaker, Tackling Systemic Risk on Markets: Barings
and Beyond, in THE FUTURE FOR THE GLOBAL SECURITIES MARKET 259, 261 (F. Oditah
ed. 1996). Similarly, convergence is described as "the process by which the rules, regulations, or
political institutions governing economic activity in different countries become more similar." See
Henry Laurence, Spawning the SEC, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.647, 649 (1999).
74.
Alex Y. Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of Values, CORNELL INT'L L.J. 429,
465-469 (1997) (arguing that sharing the same values promotes "similar expectations and a common
ground for understanding" and thereby creating the closer relationship in human society).
75.
Policy convergence is composed of different dimensions including policy goals, "a coming
together of intent to deal with common policy problems," policy instruments, "the institutional tools
available to administer policy, whether regulatory, administrative or judicial," and policy style, "a
more diffuse notion signifying the process by which policy responses are formulated." See C.J.
Bennett, What is Policy Convergence and What Causes It?, 21 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 215,219 (1991).
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style. Namely, in response to the financial globalization, the international
cooperation has produced the widespread adoption of similar regulatory
technique and harmonized global standards by way of negotiated and
multinational agreements among different national regulatory
authorities. 76
While the convergence advocates note that the global convergence does
not necessarily imply the convergence of identical regulatory standards
and structures among different nations, they emphasize the convergence
of basic values and fundamental systems to promote the reliance on
market forces thus attracting international businesses and increasing
economic benefits.77
In this regard, one of the most controversial debates in the field of
international economic law concerns the desirability of international
cooperation. Explaining the relationship between internationalization and
public choice, one of the proponents for international cooperation
advocates that "international cooperation is likely to be welfareimproving in the majority of contexts, though the exact nature of that
cooperation must vary from one subject to another."78 This advocate
identifies several reasons why international cooperative efforts should be
encouraged. 79 First, the increasing inability of national authorities to
regulate transnational activities and the unsuccessful non-cooperative
strategies need international cooperation. Second, international
cooperation is desirable and successful because of the increase in welfare
associated with cooperation in trade liberalization under the WTO
despite its value-subtracting cooperation. Third, even if international
cooperation can be welfare-reducing, the argument for cooperation may
be strengthened since the cooperation allowed nations to consider a
broader range of interests thus producing a remarkable growth in trade
and welfare.

76.
One describes this convergence process as "negotiated convergence" because it is the
byproduct of extensi ve negotiation among different regulatory authorities and the usual
compromises and trade-offs inherent in bargaining. See Heidi Mandanis Schooner & Michael
Taylor, Convergence and Competition: The Case of Bank Regulation in Britain and the United
States. 20 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 595, 597-598 (1999).
77.
Laurence, supra note 73, at 649-650; see also Seita, supra note 73, at 466-469.
78.
Andrew T. Guzman, Public Choice and International Regulatory Competition. 90 GEO.
L.J. 971, 972-974 (2002). By contrast, Stephan and O'Hara's skepticism identifies about the
potential hazards of international cooperation resulting from the probability and the costs of welfarereducing international agreements through facilitating transfer payments and logrolling. See Paul B.
Stephan, The Political Economy of Choice of Law. 90 GEO. LJ. 957, 960-961 (2002); Erin A.
O'Hara, Economics. Public Choice. and the Perennial Conflict of Law. 90 GEO. LJ. 941,948-956
(2002).
79.
Guzman, supra note 78, at 978-979.
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To support the argument, the international cooperation advocate asserts
the determination of the appropriate level of cooperation when it should
be used. 80 In particular, it is worth noting that when the other levels of
cooperation fail, supranational standards and regulations should be
alternatively taken into account because of their potential to reduce the
cost of transfers among nations which makes it easier to reach an
agreement. 8l
In contrast to the international cooperation advocate, some argue that
international cooperative efforts have faced a great degree of skepticism
at the national level because the efforts lack the political accountability
of elected and appointed officials at national and local levels. 82 Thus, the
domestic decision-makers or bureaucrats face severe constraints on their
behavior as opposed to international lawmakers thereby bearing some
political accountability for their choices. 83 Also, international cooperative
efforts have brought about skepticism because they lack the transparency
of local lawmaking. 84 Due to the lack of transparency, a great rate of
economic rents and returns in excess of what is necessary to keep a given
resource from transferring to other occupation, have been sought all over
the world. As such, bureaucrats may foil the cooperative efforts unless
they have chances to engage in rent seeking thereby decreasing
transparency and engaging in turf protection. 85 Furthermore, the
pessimistic perspective on cooperative efforts classifies into two
categories the reasons why international cooperation may produce
undesirable outcomes.

80.
See id. at 980-983 (providing several levels of cooperation that are available: first, a
laissez-faire system as the lowest level of cooperation, second, a nation's setting of the terms of its
interactions with other nations through a unilateral selection of choice-of-law rules, third, an
agreement on choice-of-law rules without any comments on substantive rules, fourth, harmonization
of substantive laws as a higher level of cooperation, alternatively, supranational standards and
regulations as the highest level of cooperation).
81.
See id. at 983 (taking as the best examples of this strategy, international trade and
international intellectual property under the WTO, and international banking regulation through the
Basel Accord).
82.
Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmoniwtion in International
Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 743, 752 (\999) (arguing that this is because "[n]o mechanism
exists for voters to pass judgment on the international lawmakers. At best, they can vote for the
domestic governments that in tum
chose the drafters of international agreements.").
83.
Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and
Legitimacy, \ 7 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 681, 682, 732 (1996-97).
84.
See id. at 699 (positing that "interest groups tend to have somewhat lower costs of
expressing their preferences to executives engaged in international lawmaking than in conveying
their wishes to domestic legislators, and that the general public has higher monitoring costs with
respect to international lawmaking").
85.
Stephan, supra note 83, at 706.
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First, negotiators may give excessive weight to the preferences of private
groups with unrepresentative preferences but especially low
organizational costs. Second, persons with an interest in the institutions
established or promoted by international cooperation may seek the
adoption of agreements that expand the competence, discretion, and
authority of those institutions at the expense of desirable regulatory
outcomes. 86
More importantly, this pessinustic point of view on the cooperative
efforts points out the costs of cooperation and welfare-reducing
agreements. 87 The grounds for welfare-reducing international cooperation
fall into three categories.
First, the negotiators have powerful incentives to achieve some kind of
agreement regardless of substantive outcome. 88 Association with a
concluded agreement brings prestige opportunities to offer interpretation,
and invitation to participate in subsequent negotiations. Second, the
legislatures face take-it-or-Ieave-it choices that limit their power to shape
what gets adopted. Thus, they are [unlikely] to reject agreements that
may reduce overall welfare. 89 Third, the difficulty of reaching the
sustained level of agreement necessary to permit frequent updates of
existing agreements pushes negotiators toward delegations of lawmaking
authority to international institutions. 90
Even if international cooperative efforts have been remarkably increasing
over the last decades, there is still concern that international cooperation
has pitfalls and should be approached cautiously.91 As noted, the lack of
86.
Stephan, supra note 78, at 960-961.
87.
In general, the costs incurred by a potentially undesirable agreement, discounted by the
likelihood of the structure producing such an agreement is greater than the benefits of a potentially
desirable agreement, discounted by the likelihood of a particular institutional structure achieving it.
See id.at 960.
88.
In response to this argument, Guzman advocates that this does not show an important
ground to resist international cooperation for three reasons. First, as long as a pro-agreement bias
exists among the negotiators as agents for the nations, the principals have an incentive to correct for
this through a change in the negotiators. Second, there are many ways to "reach a deal" without
imposing important commitments on a nation under international law. Third, despite a bias toward
some kind of agreement, the bias may be helpful rather than harmful in light of the overall
negotiating structure of international law, under which the consent of every participating nation is
required for international agreements in accordance with the unanimity rule. See id. at 974-975.
89.
As for this argument, Guzman casts doubts for two reasons. First, the negotiators are
controlled by the executive, and thus the nation has a chance to shape the content of the agreement.
Second, the legislature's decision to accept a take-it-or-Ieave-it offer does not imply that it is not
likely to approve a welfare-reducing agreement. See id.at 975-976.
90.
[d. at 961. In contrast to this concern of entrenchment by international bureaucrats,
Guzman claims that the concern is a concern about the form of cooperation rather than its merit
since many forms of cooperation can proceed without formal institutions. See id. at 975.
91.
Paul B. Stephan, supra note 83.
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transparency, the lack of political accountability and the rent-seeking
may impede convergence.92 Here, it should be noted that there is no trend
to homogeneity in world economies as opposed to the globalization
thesis. Moreover, modernization and Westernization are not converging
trends in contrast to the underlying premise of global convergence
scholarship implies. 93
With respect to the convergence thesis, some argue that nations still
pursue diverse policy choices. In this regard, one examines the
hypothesis that the Keynesian welfare policies of West European nations
will be eroded by the international financial integration and concludes
that notwithstanding the increased exertion of capital integration over the
past two decades, "powerful pressures for convergence in economic
policies,"94 such convergence has not happened, and that "the evidence
on fiscal policy conflicts sharply with the convergence thesis."95 Another
argues that "the international outcome [of financial integration] is solidly
rooted in domestic policy dilemmas and distributional debates, "and that
"[financial] markets remained distinctively national."96
Nevertheless, the global convergence fueled by the process of
globalization has grown significantly in international economic affairs.
As a matter of fact, international cooperative efforts have brought up the
less complete global convergence of harmonization in regulatory
standards. Therefore, international convergence of regulatory standards
and legal rules has increasingly become a noticeable trend in the global
finance. Thus, for capital market concerns, several international forums
have been created to cooperate in setting minimum standards among
various international bodies as a process of the global convergence. 97

92.
In addition, one indicates as one of the grounds the pretentious "we know better" tone of
much of the convergence advocacy. See Branson, supra note 72, at 339.
93.
John Gray, FALSE DAWN: THE DELUSIONS OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM 169-170
(1998) cited in Branson, supra note 72, at 349. It is argued that for much of the world, modernization
and Westernization have become diverging trends or, indeed, anathema to one another.
94.
Geoffrey Garrett, Capital Mobility, Trade, and the Domestic Politics of Economic Policy,
49 INT'L ORG. 657, 657 (1995).
95.
See id.at 659.
96.
Andrew C. Sobel, Domestic Choices, INTERNATIONAL MARKETS 19, 143 (1994),
cited in Laurence, supra note 73, at 652-653.
97.
The international cooperation and coordination in global finance have been underway
through the Basel Committee, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO),
the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (lAIS), the International Accounting
Standards Committee (IASC), the Joint Forum, and the Financial Stability Forum. Moreover, the
International Monetary Fund (IMp) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) have played a major role in helping assess the fragilities of global markets
and enhancing institutional coordination and exchange of information. See Joseph J. Norton, A "New
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III.

IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBALIZATION FOR STATE
SOVEREIGNTY

A.

THE BACKDROP

[Vol. 10

The process of globalization has transformed the traditional view of
international law for the nation-state sovereignty, which is associated
with exclusive territorial jurisdiction since the Treaty of Westphalia in
1648.98 The traditional notion of the state sovereignty has been subject to
critical scrutiny due to the rapid financial integration, the growth of
regionalism around the globe, and the advent of international regulatory
regimes. 99
In recent years, the impact of globalization on the dominance and
autonomy of nation-state has been increasingly the subject of heated
debate cutting across various disciplines. Some observers stress a need
for "relocation of authority," both to the international level for problems
for which the share is too small to operate effectively, and to the substate level, for tasks for which it are too large. loo Others claim that states
have lost sovereign authority in the face of independent regulatory
activities by business association. 101 This results from "the alleged loss of
functions to international institutions, to pressure to develop power to
regional movements demanding autonomy or secession, and to the

International Financial Architecture?"- Reflections on the Possible Law-Based Dimension, 33
INT'L LAW 891,899-904 (1999).
98.
Since the 17th century, the modern state has been the dominant entity in domestic and
international affairs both in terms of power and regulatory authority. See John Ruggie, Territoriality
and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations, 47 INT'L ORG. 139, 174 (1993).
99.
Kanishka Jayasuriya, Globalization, Law, and the Transformation of Sovereignty: The
Emergence of Global Regulatory Governance, 6 GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. J. 425, 426 (1999)
(arguing that "[t]he notion of a single unified system of internal sovereignty [the development of the
internal coherence within the nation-state] has become increasingly problematic in a global political
economy surrounded by islands of sovereignty, rather than by a single, central decisionmaking
authority"). Jayasuriya claims that the development of this "complex sovereignty" reflects the
transformation and reconstitution of the notion of nation-state and sovereignty in the light of
financial globalization. Id
100.
P. Kennedy, PREPARING THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 131 (1993).
101. L. A. Kahn, The Extinction of Nation-State, 7 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 197 (1992)
(noting the gradual ending of the primacy of the traditional state); see also Jan A. SchoIte, Global
Capitalism and the State, 73 INT'L AFFAIRS 427, 444-445 (1997) (arguing that "the end of state
sovereignty does not mean the end of state"). Scholte recognizes that the more powerful states have
retained important influence in contemporary global finance. ld
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difficulty of effectively controlling large multinational enterprises, the
flows of international finance and of information and ideas. "102
The new medievalists proclaiming the end of the nation-state emphasize
the role of non-state actors with multiple allegiances and global
network 103 while liberal internationalists lO4 recognize a need for
international rules and institutions, constituted by a legally binding
treaty, with expanding powers of governance to solve states' problems.
The adherents of new medievalism also conceive the development of a
complex and varied international order with multiple layers and actors
that is more akin to the order of medieval times. lOS
In this sense, this view is construed as "a back-to-the-future model of the
twenty-first century."I06

Another view of the "chaos paradigm" specifically addresses the decline
of nation-state as an institution. I07 This view highlights the sharp rise in
tribal, ethnic and religious conflict, the rapid increase in the activities of
international criminal mafia organizations, the proliferation of biological,
chemical and nuclear weapons, the increase of international terrorism,
the problem of massive refugee flows and the appearance of acts of
genocide and "ethnic cleansing."los

I 02.
Peter Malanczuc, Globalization and the Future Role of Sovereign State, in
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW WITH A HUMAN FACE 46-47 (Friedl Weiss et a!., eds.
1998).
103. Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, 76 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, No. I (Jan./Feb. 1997) at 64
(describing a shift away from the state-up, down, and sideways----to supra-state, sub-state, and
above all, non·state actors").
104. Michael Zuern, From Independence to Globalization. in THE HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 235 (Walter Carlsnaes et a!., eds. 2000). The liberal
internationalism requires a centralized rule-making authority, a hierarchy of organizations, and
universal membership: the United Nations is one of the standard or classical models of international
institutions.
105.
See generally Samuel Huntington, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATION AND THE
REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996).
106.
Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order. 76 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, No.5 (Sep.!
Oct. 1997) at 183. Slaughter pointed out two central weak points of the new medievalism: first,
private power does not take the place of state power; second, "the power shift is not a zero-sum
game [because] [a] gain in power by non-state actors does not necessarily translate into a loss of
power for the state." See id. at 184.
107.
See Huntington, supra note 105.
108.
See Zbigniew Brzezinski, OUT OF CONTROL (1993); see also Daniel Moynihan,
PANDAEMONIUM: ETHNICITY IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. cited in Huntington. supra
note II, at 35. This is a world in anarchic and chaotic world characterized by the breakdown of
governmental authority, the dismemberment and fragmentation of states and the appearance of
"failed states": Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, Burundi, Afghanistan, and Yugoslavia. See G.B. Helman
et a!., Saving Failed Sates. 89 FOREIGN POLICY 21 (1992); see also Oscar Schachter, The Erosion
of State Authority and its Implications for equitable Development. in International Economic Law
with a Human Face 40-42 (F.Weiss et a!.. ed .• 1998).
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At the other extreme, adherents of the realist tradition of "international
regime" continue to stress the primacy of the nation-state as the central
actor. 109 This view has pointed out, in some instances; globalization has
led to the expansion of government authority and government spending
instead of diminishing the authority of the nation-state. ItO
By contrast, the adherents of "transgovernmentalism" recognizes that
"[t]he state is not disappearing, it is dis aggregating into its separate,
functionally distinct parts.,,111 That is to say, that trans-governmentalism
notes the frequent interaction among decentralized government agencies
(global networks) all over the world rather than formal negotiation. This
point of view argues that "[r]egular interaction with foreign colleagues
offers new channels for spreading democratic accountability,
governmental integrity, and the rule of law."112 The proponent claims that
trans governmental networks represent "a blueprint for the international
architecture of the 21 51 century." 113
However, some critiques acknowledge the significance of networks, but
hold them as accountable for the reduced transparency and impediment
to political accountability. 114 Others fear that networks may reinforce the
dominance of the major economic powers, particularly inequalities
between advanced industrial countries and less developed economy
because networks are club-like. ll5

109.
Robert Gilpin, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT
(1975).
Geoffrey Garnett, Capital Mobility, Trade and the Domestic Politics of Economic Policy,
I 10.
14 INT'L ORG. 683 (\995).
Ill.
Slaughter, supra note 106, at 184. Slaughter argues that "[d]isaggregating the state permits
the disaggregation of sovereignty as well, ensuring that specific state institutions derive strength and
status from participation in transgovernmental order." Id. at 196. Trans-governmentalism is based on
international relations theory. In particular, Keohane and Nye initiated the exploration of "transgovernmental relations" to demonstrate how trans-governmentalism promoted international
organizations in the early 1970s. See Robert Keohane & Joseph Nye, Trans-governmental Relations
and International Organizations, 27 WORLD POLITICS 39 (1974).
112.
See id. at 186. According to Slaughter, transgovernmentalism is arguably more effective
and potentially more accountable than any other alternatives since it leaves the control of
government agencies in the hands of "national citizens" rather than "supranational bureaucracies"
answerable to no one in the liberal internationalism. She asserts that although new medievalism
attracts "states' rights enthusiasts" and "superanationalists," it could easily reflect the worst of both
worlds.ld.
1l3.
See id. at 197.
114.
See generally Robert Howse, Regulatory Cooperation and the Problem of Democracy, in
TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION 469 (George A. Bermann et a\., ed. 2000).
115.
David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, 32 N.Y.U. J. In!'1 L. &
Pol. 335, 412 (2000) (questioning whether exploring the "disaggregation of the state and the
empowerment of diverse actors in an international civil society without asking who will win and
who will lose by such an arrangement" is prudent).
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Taxation: Sovereign Authority

187

Historically, a state's fiscal legislation was construed as a national issue
in character. 116 In the most antique forms, taxation regimes have evolved
from two competing concepts that "every man payeth equally for what
he useth,"117 and that "the subjects of every state ought to contribute
towards the support of the government, as nearly as possible, in
proportion to their respective abilities. liB These two divergent notions
have been respectively considered as the benefit, and the ability-to-pay
theories. 119
Under the backdrop, fiscal authority is an essential constituent to any
government since it provides revenue for national cost and expenditure
that enables a nation to maintain the existence and operation of the
government benefit its citizens and compete with foreign countries. 120
Because taxes are one feature of national cost and expenditure, taxation
has been traditionally viewed as the nation-states' sovereignty to levy
and collect taxes from all entities within their jurisdictions. 121
In the meantime, the financial globalization has brought up the hot
academic debate as to whether a nation-state's absolute authority and
jurisdiction over fiscal matters can continue irrespective of the impact of
internationalization. Because economic integration and activities across
borders, and technology advances have made taxation significantly more
116.
Stephen G. Utz, Tax Harmonization and Coordination in Europe and America, 9 Conn. J.
InCI L. 767, 767-768 (1994) (indicating that traditional tax policy was based on national economic
systems that seldom affected each other).
117.
Thomas Hobbes, THE LEVIATHAN 239 (Richard Tuck ed. 1991) (1651).
118.
Adam Smith, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 310 (Edwin Cannan ed. 1925) (1776).
119.
According to the benefit theory, a just tax distributes the tax burden in accordance with the
distribution of governmental goods and services. See James Buchanan, The Pure Theory of
Government Finance: A Selected Approach, in ASCAL THEORY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY:
SELECTED ESSAYS 12 & n. 5 (1960) (1940). By contrast, under the pure ability-to-pay theory,
those with greater capacity pay more tax. See Smith, supra note 118, at 310.
120.
Frederick Bassinger & Michel Glautier, A REFERNCE GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION xi (1987) (conceding that any government emphasized historically the significance of
revenue to raise and maintain armies, and obtain allegiances of its subjects, and that declined
sovereigns lost the control when the ability to collect taxes ceased); see also Reuven Avi-Yonah,
Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1573,
1626 (2000) (arguing that tax policies approved by nation's citizens reflect society and quality of life
that citizens prefer).
121.
Utz, supra note 116, at 772 (describing that nations tax on the basis of traditional legal
norms regarding sovereigns and their authority over individuals and entities within their borders);
see also Bassinger & Glautier, supra note 120, at x, xi (noting that jurisdiction extended to
"geographical boundaries," which defined nation's territory under international norms, and that
historically, taxation authority is national in character).
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challenging,122 the traditional concept of state's fiscal sovereignty and
taxing jurisdiction has been subject to scrutiny.l23
Some observes
conceded the interdependence between national tax systems and
international economic relations. 124 Moreover, others have acknowledged
the impact of international economic integration on domestic tax
policies. l25 Nevertheless, some argue that no international law limits the
state's authority to prescribe its fiscal legislations, and thus the nationstate can maintain its autonomy in fiscal legislation. 126 However, the
realism is that states need to interact with their sovereign global
neighbors to compete in world trade under the international regulatory
regime.
Understandably, the time has come to take account of how the nationstate can exercise its fiscal sovereignty over individuals and entities in
the era of the international economic integration. In that context, it
deserves noting international cooperative efforts in the global economic
affairs in the wake of the recent worldwide financial turbulence.
Needless to say, a special attention should be paid to adapt national fiscal
authority and their taxing jurisdictions to the new financial environment.

122.
Vito Tanzi, Globalization, Technological Developments, and the Work of Fiscal Termites,
26 BROOK J. INT'L L. 1261 (2001) (arguing that collecting taxes is becoming harder due to a long
list of "fiscal termites" gnawing at the foundations of taxation regimes: more cross-border shopping,
the increased mobility of skilled labor, the growth of electronic commerce, the expansion of tax
heavens, the development of new financial instruments and intermediaries, growing trade within
multinational companies, and the possible replacement of bank accounts with electronic money
embedded in "smart cards").
123.
Timo Virenkentta, Tax Incentives in Developing Countries and International Taxation: A
Study on the Relationship between Income Tax Incentives for Inward Foreign Investment, in
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND TAXATION OF FOREIGN N ICOME IN CAPITALEXPORTING COUNTRIES 43 (1991) (stating that extent of national fiscal sovereignty became
subject of controversy).
124.
Vtz, supra note 116, at 770 (noting common belief that national taxes affect international
business, and are not independent of competitive conditions in global neighbors, thus national tax
systems should accordingly transnational).
125.
Rutsel Silvestre J. Martha, THE JURISDICTION TO TAX IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATIVE FISCAL JURISDICTION 11 (1989)
(acknowledging that internationalization of trade and increasing mobility of people and capital
resulted in the assessment of impact of international law in fiscal law); see also Arnold Knechtel,
BASIC PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIOANL FISCAL LAW 10 (asserting that increased crossborder movements established a need for modifying tax systems to address new fiscal issues); see
also Ramon J. Jefferey, THE IMPACT OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY ON GLOBAL TRADE AND
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION (1999) (indicating that the nature of a state's role requires nationstates increasingly become aware that it is appropriate for certain international taxation matters to be
dealt with not at the national, but at the international level, through the international law-making
process).
126. THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW OF TAXATION: TEXT, CASES AND
MATERIALS 24 (Asif H. Qureshi ed. 1994) (asserting that acceptance of state's right to tax
pursuant to its respective jurisdiction is not limited by international law); see also Bassinger &
Glautier, supra note 120, at xi (arguing that" ... nations jealously protect their right to tax people and
objects within their jurisdictions").
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The Problem with Double Taxation

Historically, with the establishment of territorial jurisdiction, the nationstate has adopted its formal tax system while the type and method can
vary in accordance with its need. 127 The capacity of any government to
levy and collect taxes from the subjects within its national territory is
based on one or all of the three rationales: "citizenship"128 based taxation;
"residence"129 based taxation; "source"130 based taxation.
However, the expansion of economic activities across border has posed
challenges to the absolute fiscal authority of states. That is, the
conventional taxing structure did not face any impediments to the
exercise of the domestic tax policy when the mobility of labor and
resources was not easy, but the taxing mechanism has failed to address
fiscal issues due to the increasing movement of economic activities
across national borders.
When entities extend their activities into other jurisdictions, they expose
themselves to the potential of taxation in an increasingly number of
jurisdictions. 131 The entity is subject to "double taxation" due to the
extension of its activities into foreign jurisdictions. 132 The problem of
double taxation is that multiple nations' taxing authorities attempt to
claim jurisdiction over the same activity or entity results in conflicts of
law. 133 The conflicting rules resulting from the intersection of the states

127. See id.
128. See id. at 37. In a citizenship based fiscal jurisdiction, as long as the entity is a citizen of
that state, he incurs tax liability. An individual's citizenship is commonly established by the birth
place while corporations are deemed citizens of the jurisdiction where they are incorporated. [d. at
37-40.
129.
See id. at 37. In a residence based fiscal jurisdiction, regardless of whether the taxpayer is a
citizen, simply being a resident of that jurisdiction is single rationale sufficient to incur a tax. An
individual's residence is based on where he normally lives while the residence of a corporation is
presumed to be where it was incorporated. However, this is not always the case. [d. at 44.
130. See id. at 37. In a source based fiscal jurisdiction, where neither citizenship nor residency
is relevant, if an entity derives income from a source within that jurisdiction, it has incurred tax
liability therein. Source, as applied to both individuals and corporations, most commonly describes
the geographic location from where income is derived. [d. at 38, 47 -48.
131. Bassinger & Glautier, supra note 120, at 151 (indicating that taxpayers may face triple
taxation: taxes from country of citizenship, residence country, and country where income is
generated).
TAX
CONVENTION,
available
at
132.
OECD,
1992
MODEL
DOUBLE
http://www.oecd.orgldaflfaltreaties.treaty.htm (describing international double taxation as
imposition of taxes by two or more nations against same income generated by single taxpayer in
foreign country).
133. The problem of double taxation is raised when each jurisdiction levies and collects taxes
from activities and entities within its border as it deems appropriate. See Bassinger & Glautier, supra
note 120, at 165.
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attribute to the multitude factors behind tax law, social policy,
administrative constraints, and political compromise. 134
Under the dominant approach, the taxation of active business income is
allocated to the source country, and the passive invest income is
allocated to the residence jurisdiction. Arguably, in spite of the lack of a
flrm economic and analytic basis, this basic division has prevailed to the
present, but it has misrepresented its practicalityYs Notably, the efforts to
solve the problem of double taxation have been made by both the
adoption of bilateral treaties and domestic legislation. 136 In particular,
redressing double taxation at the international level requires the
cooperation of multiple states to establish agreements in terms of
treaties.137 Under the circumstances, many observers concede the
effectiveness of treaties in preventing double taxation. 138
The initial efforts to prevent double taxation have been asserted to create
the international tax regime. 139 That is, the regime was arguably
developed in the 1920s following the League of Nations' study on ways
to avoid international double taxation. 140 Despite the critics over the nonexistence of supreme body or law in the international tax regime, this
system has brought a special attention in the age of internationalization
and international economic integration. Regardless of the advent of
134.
Diane M. Ring, One Nation among Many: Policy Implications of Cross· Border Tax
Arbitrage, 44 B.C.L. REV. 79, 80-81 (stating that conflicting rules render one of two results:
taxation or nontaxation).
135.
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Transaction: A Proposal for
Simplification, 74 TEX L. REV. 1301, 1306-1313 (1996) (reviewing and justifying historical and
current patterns of taxing active and passive income).
136. Tsilly Dagan, The Tax Treaties Myth, 32 N.Y.UJ. INT'L L. & POL. 939, 939-941 (2000)
(asserting that treaties playa less important role in reducing double taxation, and that the problem
can be solved properly by national legislation).
137.
See id. at 941 (acknowledging that conventional account of double taxation redress
emphasizes mutual cooperation among states); see also Robert Thornton Smith, Tax Treaty
Interpretation by the Judiciary, 49 TAX LAW 845, 845-846 (1996); THE PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF TAXATION, supra note 126, at 126-127 (noting that effective
remedial double taxation treaties need negotiations among multiple states).
138. John F. Avery Jones, Are Tax Treaties Necessary?, 53 TAX L. REV. 1,2-3 (1999) (stating
that the success of tax treaties is illustrated by treaty proliferation during last 50 years). Under the tax
treaty network, signatory countries signatory states agree on a maximum of tax rate and how the
total tax should be allocated among each signatory state. Moreover, the country of residence grants
an exemption or a credit to the taxpayer for the paid tax on income in another country (foreignsource income). See Smith, supra note 137, at 845-846.
139.
Some denies the existence of international taxation. See David Rosenbloom, International
Tax Arbitrage and the "International Tax System", 53 TAX L. REV. 137, 140-141, 166 (2000)
(asserting that "that system appears imaginary," because in the real world, only the different tax laws
of various countries exist, and those laws vary greatly from each other).
140.
Avi-Yonah, supra note 135, at 1303-1304 (arguing that "[t]he existence of this regime
shows that despite each country's claim to sovereignty to in tax matters, it is possible to reach an
internationally acceptable consensus that will be followed by the majority of the world's taxing
jurisdictions").
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international tax regime, the global cooperative efforts to prevent double
taxation for last several decades has posed opportunities and challenges
to the fiscal sovereignty of each nation-state.
3.

Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage

As the mobility of capital resources becomes easier, taxpayers seek to

move their resources into low or zero-tax jurisdictions. Conflicts in tax
rules offer taxpayer's unique opportunities to engage in profitable tax
planning where their activities are subjected to multi nations' different
tax rules. As such, taxpayers' ability to take advantage of these
differences to prevent their income from being taxed anywhere poses
challenges to the fiscal authority of each country. This is a problem with
cross-border tax arbitrage. 141
Furthermore, international economic integration and technological
advances have propelled the entities' to exploit the differences between
tax rules.
Recently, the cross-border tax arbitrage issue has come into sharp focus.
Some argue that international tax arbitrage is "the planning focus of the
future," and the natural response of taxpayers to the normal differences
that occur between any two taxes systems assuming that it does not
represent egregious abuse of the tax system. 142 It is asserted that the effect
of tax arbitrage is similar to simply having different tax rates in different
fiscal jurisdictions. 143
By contrast, other observers claim that the entities' activities to exploit
the tax-law conflicts violate the single tax principle: income from crossborder transactions should be subject to tax just once as applied to double
taxation and tax evasion. l44 More importantly, the government faces its
revenue shortfalls resulting from tax avoidance through cross-border tax
141. Philip R. West, Foreign Law in U.S. International Taxation: The Search/or Standards, 3
FLA. TAX REV. 147, 171 (1996) (defining cross-border tax arbitrage as taking advantage of
inconsistencies between different countries' tax rules to achieve a more favorable result than that
which would have resulted from investing in a single jurisdiction); see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
Commentary, 53 TAX L. REV. 167, 167 (2000) (describing international tax arbitrage as
"inconsistent national treatment of the same entity or transactions that can produce multiple tax
benefits or detriments").
142.
Rosenbloom, supra note 139, at 166.
143. ld. at 149.
144. Avi-Yonah, supra note 141, at 171 (noting that the embodiment of the single tax principle
in the typical title of the tax treaties "for the prevention of double taxation" <not more than once>
and "fiscal evasion" <not less than once». "International tax arbitrage is a natural primary target of
attempts to enforce the single tax rule, because unlike differences in rates, it results from exploiting
interactions between the laws of two countries that clearly were not intended by either." See id. 172173.
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arbitrage. Governments may move from relatively less efficient taxing
mechanisms to more efficient mechanisms in response to revenue deficit
due to tax avoidance. As a result, cross-border tax arbitrage may push up
governments' marginal cost of funds by forcing increases in taxes that
are more distortionary than a properly operating income tax system. 145
However, it is not easy to know what the proper view of cross-border tax
arbitrage. As a matter of fact, too many inconsistencies and frequent
changes in nations' tax rules have offered new opportunities tax
arbitrage, and thus governments have difficulty in dealing with such
arbitrage through minor legislation. l46 Additionally, the responses to the
arbitrage issue vary among countries. Under the circumstances,
addressing cross-border tax is critical challenges to the nations' fiscal
authority. 147 In this regard, it deserves noting an analysis of cross-border
tax arbitration by proposing a balancing test for determining the adequate
treatment of specific cases. 148
4.

Tax Competition or Harmonization

The current debate and discussion in the international dimension of
taxation focus heavily on whether tax competition is undesirable. In this
regard, it is argued that global cooperative efforts should be made toward
international tax harmonization. Indeed, many scholars and experts have
figured out the nature and effects of tax competition. Others have
emphasized the desirability and feasibility of tax harmonization.
Moreover, the OECD's effort to curb tax competition has ignited the
debate. In order to respond to the inquiry, a special attention should be
given toward adjusting international tax regime without usurping the
fiscal sovereignty of the nation states.
Understandably, there is a linkage between globalization and tax
competition, 149 which can be meant by the use of taxation by
governments to induce business activities to their jurisdictions. ISO The

145. Julie Roin, Taxation without Coordination, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 61,75 (2002).
146.
See id. at 76.
147.
Daniel Shaviro, Money on the Table?: Responding to Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage, 3 CHI.
J. INT'L 317, 331 (2002) (arguing that "addressing cross-border tax arbitrage has at least the
potential to help everyone move in the direction of greater worldwide cooperation, while also
possibly advancing purely national ends in the here and now").
148.
Ring, supra note 134, at 136-\39.
149. Jonathan Talisman, Challenges Facing Tax Policy in the Coming Years, Remarks to the
National Conference on Federal Taxes (Nov. 7, 2000) (stating that "international tax competition
occurs when one country provides a tax inducement to attract capital from another country").
ISO.
Michael A. Livingston, Blum and Klaven at 50: Progressive Taxation, "Globalization," and
the New Millennium, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 731,742-744 (2000) (stating that globalization encourages
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mobility of capital resource and business actIvIties driven by
international economic integration have pushed governments to employ
new tax mechanisms such as tax incentives to attract foreign
investment,151 and tax exemptions in response to competitive pressures
from global neighbors. As such, all entities have extended their activities
across borders with the reduction of barriers associated with world trade
liberalization.
In the meantime, the effects of tax competition are open to hot debate.
Theoretical arguments indicate the overall positive benefits of tax
competition on business organizations, tax authorities, and economies. 152
According to empirical studies, generally foreign direct investment reacts
positively to lower tax rates, and tax competition tends to have a positive
impact on attracting foreign investment. 153 More importantly, adherents
of tax competition assert that tax competition improves government
efficiency and social welfare, and reduces government waste. 154
On the other hand, other theoretical and empirical research points to the
negative outcomes for economies and tax authorities. 155 Some observers
are doubtful about the positive empirical results, and thereby referring to
other studies casting questions about the risks of government inefficiency
and heavier tax burdens on labor. 156 Tax competition contributes to the
fiscal crisis of the welfare state since the lower tax rates, and other tax
incentives driven by tax competition result in revenue shortfalls, and
keep governments from having sufficient funds for social welfare

tax competition and discourages progressive taxation); see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 120, at 15751579 (arguing that
globalization creates tax competition that may cause a serious social backlash).
151.
Avi-Yonah, supara note 120, at 1641-1646 (noting that some economists' argument that
developing countries should engage in the ultimate tax competition by keeping entirely from taxing
foreign investments, and others' claim that developing countries should not engage in tax
competition at all by not offering incentives to foreign investment).
152.
See id. at 1591.
153.
James R. Hines, Lessons from Behavioral Responses to International Taxation, 52 NAT'L
TAX J. 305, 308-313 (1999) (surveying and discussing the empirical studies on foreign direct
investment). However, there is a concern about the manner of attracting foreign investment. See AviYonah, supra note 120, at 1643-1648 (discussing problems of recent empirical studies on the
benefits of tax competition and arguing that developing countries would be better off ceasing tax
competition).
154. John Douglas Wilson, Theories of Tax Competition, 52 NAT'L TAX J. 269, 294-298
(1999) (arguing that tax competition may encourage welfare efficiency despite imperfect
competition that can push tax rates to zero or "commitment problems" where companies commit to
keeping operations only for as long as the initial tax subsidies remain, and claiming that tax
competition encourages government efficiency either by reducing the excessive size of government
or increasing public welfare through "expenditure competition").
155. !d. at 1592.
156.
Avi-Yonah, supra note 120, at 1643-1648.
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programs. 157 Also, tax competition is arguably considered to violate the
"capital export neutrality" principle, which holds that companies should
locate their firms where return on investment is maximized, and that tax
rates should be immaterial to the profit maximizing decisions of fIrms. 158
In other words, tax competition violates this principle because it
encourages companies to locate where they can avoid paying taxes rather
than where they would promote "worldwide efficiency and growth."159 In
short, tax competition has arguably resulted in a critical potential for tax
evasion and avoidance on the income from cross-border portfolio and
direct investments leading to important tax base erosion and revenue
defIcit. 160 With this background, governments have been concerned about
the negative impacts of tax competition, which may reduce the states' tax
revenue.
In response to the concerns and requests of its member states,161 the
OECD initiated a study to address the tax competition issue, and issued a
report, which identifies the cause and effects of tax competition. 162 This
Harmful Tax Competition Report describes the effects of "harmful tax
competition," providing counteractive measures. According to the report,
harmful tax competition occurs when a country's fIscal jurisdiction
collects critical income on certain income but has preferential features
that subject other income to low or no taxation. 163 This regime is viewed
undesirable since it redirects capital resources and fInancial flows, and
the corresponding tax revenue from one jurisdiction to another in an
aggressive bid, which is not an incidental effect of the implementation of
national policy.l64 The concern is that such actions will interfere with
other countries' tax systems, causing changes .that may distort "patterns
of trade and investment and reduce global welfare."165

157. See id. at 1632-1639.
158.
Karen B Brown, Harmful Tax Competition: The OECD View, 32 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L
L. & ECON. 311, 311-312 (1999).
159. [d.
160. Avi-Yonah, supra note 120, at 1579-1603.
161. The OECD members are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
162. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, HARMFUL TAX
COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUES (1998) (hereinafter Harmful Tax
Competition Report).
163. See id. at 26.
164.
[d. at 16.
165. [d. at 14.
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The Harmful Tax Competition Report has received a special attention
from commentators. Some argue that the regulation of tax competition
infringes on the fiscal sovereignty of the nation-state. 166 Also, it should be
noted that the Harmful Tax Competition Report ignores the national
taxation features of industrial states and its effect on the economies of
less-developed countries. 167 By contrast, others point to the revenue
statistics in the member nations of the OECD, and note that the sustained
reduction in tax revenue in the countries in the 1990s has pushed the
OECD and EU to take policy actions against negative effects resulting
from tax competition. l68 Moreover, the dynamic and interconnection
between trade globalization and international tax regime is increasing
pressures for international tax harmonization. l69 Despite strong
arguments in favor of tax harmonization, there is still a need to take
account of the impediments to reaching international tax harmonization.
Even if tax harmonization is desirable, its potential danger should be
considered.
As a matter of fact, cooperative efforts have been made to harmonize or
coordinate national tax rates, particularly in the area of capital income
taxation. 170 Although the implementation of this agreement remains
doubtful, the possibility of harmonizing tax bases by development of a
uniform definition of taxable income has been discussed. 171
Some point out that the alleged benefits of uniformity stem from two
quite disparate sources. The first being administrative advantages in

166. George M. Melo, Comment, Taxation in the Global Arena: Preventing the Erosion of
National Tax Bases or Impinging on Territorial Sovereignty?, 12 PACE INT'L L. REV. 183, 186189 (1998).
167.
Karen B. Brown, supra note 158, at 315-319.
168. Tanzi, supra note 122, at 1261-1262 (emphasizing that globalization may influence the
countries' capacity to collect taxes and the distribution of the tax burden). Tanzi notes that "in most
countries in the 1990s, the tax level has stopped growing .... " Id at 1262. However, some argues that
there is no evidence that the international economic integration and technological advances have
reduced the state's capacity to raise taxes, and that the decrease in tax burden is due to "electoral
resistance as to insuperable difficulty in collecting taxes." See Martin Wolf, Will Technology and
Global Capital Markets Change the Scope of Government? 21 CATO 1.143,144-145 (1999).
169.
Robert A. Green, Antilegalistic Approaches to Resolving Disputes Between Governments:
A Comparison of the International Tax and Trade Regimes, 23 YALE L. 1. INT'L L. 79, 87-104
(1998).
170.
Harmful Tax Competition Report, supra note 162, at 23 (stating that tax competition "may
hamper the application of progressive tax rates and the achievement of redistributive goals"). The
EU adopted a provisional agreement on how to tax interest income earned by foreign investors. See
Roin, supra note 126, at 63.
171.
Roin, supra note 147, at 63; see also Shaviro, supra note 149, at 330 (arguing that
"harmonizing tax bases often makes sense even if tax competition with respect to rate is retained or
indeed encouraged").
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terms of cost reduction and the second source is eliminating cross-border
tax arbitrage. 172
At the same time, it is argued that "[a]ny move toward tax base
harmonization will entail substantial transition costs because a
harmonized definition of taxable income undoubtedly will differ
significantly from most if not all current national systems."173 As such,
tax harmonization cannot be expected where the revenue benefits
outweigh its social COSt. 174
Moreover, the critical point to note is that people by nature are concerned
with the maximization of profits and reduction of costs, and as such the
competition for capital will continue. 175 As a consequence, the actors'
efforts to search for low tax jurisdictions will never cease, thereby
driving international tax competition. In this context, it deserves noting
one observer's evaluation of the combination of capital mobility and tax
competition from a global efficiency or equity perspective toward
balancing the problem of tax competition against democratic countries'
right to determine the size of their government, and thus developing a
distinction between harmful and acceptable form of tax competition. 176
IV.

GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL FINANCE

A.

EVALUATING GLOBAL NETWORK GOVERNANCE

The global economy raises important questions concerning the structure
of international governance177 systems intended to safeguard markets
where globalization implies the erosion of national boundaries. In this
respect, one observer argues that "[r]regulators' power to implement
national regulations within those boundaries decline both because people
See id. at 63-76.
Id.at87.
174.
Id. at 93-94.
175.
Melo, supra note 166, at 211.
176.
Avi-Y onah, supra note 120, at 1604-1631.
177.
As David Kennedy remarks in a particularly informative discussion, it "has emerged as a
distinctive motto for international public order, consciously distinguished from 'government' and
consciously identified with the group of phenomena that are thought to define the late twentiethcentury international condition: globalization, interdependence, the demise of sovereignty, the
apparent futility of further United Nations institution building, and the emergence of international
civil society. These writers identify governance as a new, distinct phenomenon: either a defining
characteristic of the new world order or a prescriptive for resolving its pragmatic challenge, or both.
'Governance' in this literature, as opposed to 'government' is the complex of more or less
formalized bundles of rules, roles, and relationships that define the social practices of the state and
non-state actors interacting in various issue areas, rather than formal interstate organizations[.]" See
David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and International
Governance, 2 UTAH L.REV. 545, 548, n.4 (1997).
172.
173.
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can easily flee their jurisdiction and because the flows of capital,
pollution, pathogens, and weapons are too great and sudden for anyone
regulator to control."178

In contrast, the liberal internationalist response to the concern about the
erosion of state regulatory power is to build a larger international
apparatus, such as the United Nations system constituted by a legally
binding treaty, with expanding powers of governance. 179
With the globalization of economic relations, and increasing
interdependence among nation-states, there is a growing conflict between
a conventional notion of territorial state sovereignty and the flow of
economic activity, which disrupts coherence of the state. In the
meantime, various agencies and institutions within the state such as
independent central banks increasingly develop a high degree of
autonomy and independence reflecting the fragmentation and/or
desegregation of the nation-state. 180
As a new system of regulatory networks in the international economy,
global network governance establishes rules coping with issues that each
nation already regulates within its territorial boundaries: crime, securities
fraud, pollution, tax evasion where traditional international law requires
states to implement the international obligations they incur through their
domestic law. 181 The adherents of trans-governmentalism argue that the
enforcement of national law has been more difficult due to globalization
propelled by information revolution. 182 This view stress regulators'
potential opportunity to reap the benefits from coordinating their
enforcement efforts with those of their foreign peers and from ensuring
that other nations adopt similar approaches. 183
Likewise, transgovernmentalists assert that the fragmentation and
desegregation of the domestic order of the nation-state is essential to the
development of international regulatory governance system. That is to
say, the global governance of the economy requires the
internationalization of state agencies and as long as these agencies
maintain a high degree of independent autonomy. This view claims that
178.
Slaughter, supra note 106, at 192.
179.
Zuern, supra note 104, at 241. Slaughter notes that "globalization thus leads to
internationalization or the transfer of regulatory authority from the national level to an international
institution." Liberals are likely to support expanding the power of international institutions to guard
against the global dismantling of the regulatory state." See Slaughter, supra note 106, at 192-193
180.
For central bank independence, see Jayasuriya; supra note 99, at 439-441.
181.
Slaughter; supra note 106, at 191.
182.
See id. at 191-192.
183.
[d. at 192.
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the operation of the global economy requires exclusive reform of
regulatory system at the national level, and the transformation of state
sovereignty represents the regulatory harmonization through "the
nationalization of international law." 184 Trans-governmentalism
highlights that each nation-state will be better able to enforce its
domestic law by implementing the agreement if foreign counterparts do
likewise in accordance with regulatory agreements between states that
are pledges of good faith that are self-enforcing. 1s5 Here is arguably the
rationale for regulatory harmonization, because laws are binding as
coercive only at the national level. 186
By contrast, the new medievalist formula of global governance is
"governance without government."IS7 However, governance without
government is governance without power, and government without
power rarely works. ISS Although the new medievalists are right to point
out the transformation of the globe through information revolution, they
neglect the fact that persuasive power of civil society in mobilizing
public opinion does not take the place of state power. 1S9
Here are notable examples of the mechanism of global governance in the
international financial area such as the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (Basel Committee), the International Organization of
Securities Commission (IOSCO), and the International Association of
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS).I90
The Basel Committee, an organization composed of 12 central bank
governors, was created by a simple agreement among the governors
themselves for a significant reform of international banking system. 191 In
1988, capital adequacy requirements for all banks were adopted by the
central bankers of the world's major financial powers under their
supervision. Its members follow their own rules. Decisions are made by
consensus and are not formally binding; however, members do
implement these decisions within their own systems.
184.
'd.
185.
See id.
186.
Id.
187.
See id. at 195.
188.
Id.
189.
See id. Mathews argues that "[b]business, citizens' organizations, ethnic groups, and crime
cartels have all readily adopted the network model [while] [g]governments ... are quintessential
hierarchies, wedded to an organizational form from incompatible with all that the new technologies
make possible." See Mathews, supra note 103, at 52.
190.
David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International
Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEXAS INT'L L. J. 281 (1998).
191. George Walker, INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION: LAW, POLICY AND
PRACfICE 17-81 (2001).
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The Basel Committee's authority is often cited as argument for taking
domestic action. National securities commissioners and insurance
regulators have followed the Basel Committee's example. The
International Organization of Securities Commissioners (lOS CO) has no
formal charter or founding treaty. Its primary purpose is to solve
problems affecting international securities markets by creating a
consensus for enactment of national legislation. 192 Its members have also
entered into information-sharing agreements on their own initiative.
The International Association of Insurance Supervisors follows a similar
model, as does the newly created Tripartite Group, an international
coalition of banking, insurance, and securities regulators the Basel
Committee created to Improve the supervISIOn of financial
conglomerates. 193
Three organizations have much in common in the way of their
organizing themselves and the manner of their seeking to achieve their
objectives. l94 All are sub-state actors, informally formed, with flexible
internal organization and decentralized bureaucracies. They often come
into operation in secrecy and informality. The institutions manage to
attain influence through a kind of decentralized enforcement of their
agreements and through links to international, regional, and national
financial regulators. 195
Although the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) is characterized as one of the international governmental
organizations in the international system, it has played a critical role in
shaping the architecture of global governance despite its feature of "lowprofile institution."I96 As the successor to the organization to the
192.
Geoffrey Underhill, Keeping Governments Out oj Politics: Transnational Securities
Market, Regulatory Cooperation, and Political Legitimacy, 21 REV. INT'L STUD 251 (1995).
193.
International Association ofInsurance Supervisors, 1994 Annual Report 2 (1995).
194. Zaring; supra note 190, at 30\ -304. These organizations are not international organizations
under international law because they lack state membership, tangible manifestations of
organizational bureaucracy, and adequate legal pedigree. According to the Restatement (Third) of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, an international organization refers to an
organization "created by an international agreement [with] a membership consisting mainly or
principally of states." See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States SS
221 (1987). In this context, Zaring argues that these organizations occupy a "twilight" legal
existence. See Zaring, supra note 190.
195.
Id.
196. James Salzman, Labor Rights Globalization and Institutions: The Role and Influence oj
the OrganizationJor Economic Cooperation and Development, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 769, 772-773
(2000); see also Slaughter, supra 106, at 196 (arguing that "[t]he next generation of institutions is ...
likely to look more like the Basel Committee, or, more formally, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, dedicated to providing a forum for transnational problem-solving
and the harmonization of national law").
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Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the OECD was
initially established to strengthen the economies of its member states,
and thereafter expanded its mission to identify common issues and
coordinate national and worldwide policies. 197 Because the OECD offers
a closed setting for its member states through the closed-door meetings,
this feature of restricted membership and transparency makes difference
from conventional international organizations. As a result, the OECD
provides a "restricted forum on virtually unrestricted topics."198
As noted above, network governance (the external dimension of complex
sovereignty) requires the functioning of independent (effective) internal
self-regulatory agencIes (the internal dimension of complex
sovereignty).I99 In this sense, globalization has propelled the
development of autonomous agencies, the development of "a state within
a state."200 It is important to note that the autonomy and independence led
to the formation of a system of network governance where these agencies
actively participated in the formulation and management of the
regulatory institutions. 20l More importantly, the trans-governmental
network governance depends on compliance, consensus, or good-faith
agreements among nations. 202 In this regard, this regulatory system is
concerned with establishing international soft law in the form of broad
regulatory standards and general regulatory standards followed by
compliance of state agencies rather than strict rules and direct
enforcement. 203
However, in response to the trans-governmentalism, some cntIcs
acknowledge that the significance of networks, but argue that they
reduce transparency and impede political accountability.204 The club-like
feature of networks may reinforce the dominance of the major economic
powers, particularly inequalities among countries. 205 Critics also claim
that networks present the political right with a useful but ultimately
dangerous substitute for traditional multilateralism 206 Here, the point to
note is the anti-globalization argument that the process of establishment
197. See id. at 773.
198.
Id. at 776-777.
199. Jayasuriya, supra note 99, at 450.
200.
Id. at 439 (pointing out "the globalization of economic relations increasingly fractures the
internal cohesiveness within the State, but this fracturing means the creation of islands of
sovereignty within the State").
201.
See id. at 450.
202.
Id. at 453.
203.
See id.
204.
Howse; supra note 114, at 12.
205.
Kennedy, supra note 1\5, at 412.
206.
Philip Alston, The Myopia of the Handmaidens: International Lawyers and Globalization,
8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 435 (1997).
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and implementation of global standards are under the Western industrial
states' dominance, and represents an emerging global network
governance that threaten undeveloped countries' state sovereignty and
takes away their freedom of action as sovereign states. 207
In this context, one observer stresses a democratization of the legislative
process by which global standards as international soft law are
established, a flexibility in implementation of the standards reflecting
local legal tradition and practice, a full incorporation of the majority of
nation-states into the legislative process concerning the development of
the standards, and a prioritization of the implementation of global
standards on a country-by-country basis. 208 In short, undeveloped
countries will apparently resist in complying with global standards unless
they have a realistic chance to absorb and accept the standards. In this
sense, the development of new standards needs to be treated as an
evolutionary and educational process. 209
Consequently, like prior views, an "all-or-nothing" perspective for the
analysis of desirable forum of global governance ignores exploring each
component of it, as it is at present in the international system. In this
sense, emphasis should be given to the corroboration of all the state and
non-state actors in the international system in terms of liberal
internationalism, trans-governmentalism, and new medievalism with full
understanding of traditional international law so that governments,
business, and NGOs, and international institutions can strengthen the
nation-state system, by helping solve problems regulators cannot deal
with.
B.

ENHANCING GLOBAL TAX GOVERNANCE

With the increasing role of the OECD in the international tax regime, the
network of international tax conventions has come into sharp focus in
recent years. Some argue that the bilateral tax treaty network is "a
triumph of international law," and a framework for the international tax
regime based on principles underlying these treaties. 2 !O That is, over 1500
bilateral tax treaties with similarity in policy and language constitute an
international tax regime. 211 Indeed, the treaties are similar because they

207.
Herbert Morais, The Quest for International Standards: Global Governance vs.
Sovereignty, 50 U. KAN L. REV. 779,779-780 (2002).
208.
See id. at 806-820.
209.
Id. at 820.
210.
Rosenbloom, supra note 139, at 164.
211.
Avi-Yonah. supra note 141, at 169.
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have been based on the same OEeD and UN models. 212 In most
countries, the treaties have priority over domestic ordinary statutes,
thereby constraining domestic tax jurisdiction. As a result, nation-states
are bound by treaty to behave in certain ways, and cannot enact
legislation to the contrary.213
Others argue that a network of bilateral tax treaties seems increasingly
inconsistent with multinational business structure. 214 It does not look
more likely to work for the international tax system. 215 As such,
multinational enterprises may take advantage of the "current situation by
planning their affairs to exploit inconsistencies in the network of national
tax laws and treaties."216 Moreover, the current treaty regime poses
challenges to developing countries. That is, many less-developed
countries find it difficult to participate in treaty network because they do
not have substantial resources to negotiate numerous treaties while a
considerable amount of time is needed to negotiate and ratify each
treaty. 217
Accordingly, one could argue that globalization has posed pressures to
the current tax rules, and critical limitations on taxing powers.218 As a
result, some claim that a multilateral agreement would provide more
flexibility than the bilateral treaty, and "replace the existing treaty with a
single, uniform text."219

212.
See id; see also OECD, Model Income Tax Convention on Income and Capital, July 23,
1992, I Tax Treaties (CCH) P 191 [hereinafter OECD Model Treaty]; U.N. Model Double Taxation
Convention Between Developed and Developing Countries, 1980, I Tax Treaties (CCH) P 206
[hereinafter UN Model Treaty]. The U.S.A. has issued a model treaty (l996), which follows the
OECD model.
213.
Avi-Yonah, supra note 139, 169. However, arguably, in some ways, the OECD Model
Treaty is a victim of its own success: Due to unattractive compromises, and the vagueness of major
provisions, and getting behind current tax developments, the effectiveness of bilateral tax treaties is
limited in removing tax impediments to cross-border investment, and in preventing international tax
avoidance. See BRIAN J. ARNOLD & MICHAELJ. McINTYRE, INT'L TAX PRIMER 100 (1995).
214.
Victor Thuronyi, International Tax Cooperation and a Multilateral Treaty, 26 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 1641, 1651 (arguing that "[t]he current network of bilateral tax treaties would work well if
each multinational corporate group were located in no more than two countries. Each bilateral tax
treaty could then appropriately provide for the taxation of the group. There is, of course no such
constraint on multinational enterprises.").
215.
See id. at 1653 (asserting that the nature of bilateral treaties limits the negotiations to the
concerns of the two countries involved, and that because global concerns are subordinate,
negotiators focus on benefits "for business headquartered in their country instead of how the treaty
fits in with the global tax system").
216. Id. at 1647.
217. Seeid.atl651.
218.
Charles E. McClure, Jr., Globalization, Tax Rules, and Sovereignty, 55 Bulletin for In!'1
Fiscal Documentation 328 (200l).
219.
Thuronyi, supra note 214, at 1641-1642. Arguably, all countries are affected by the
amendments and interpretation of the agreement at the same time.ld. at 1644. Ironically, the success
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Now is the time to examine the OECD's role in international tax regime
in terms of global governance. Here, the question is whether the OECD's
efforts at "global tax governance" as a "global tax network" are right on
target. 220 The successful functioning of the OECD in international
taxation as a global tax network depends on its intent to fill the global
governance gap in taxation. As stated above, the OECD has been
criticized for its restricted membership, the feature of rich man's club,
and the lack of transparency. In particular, the inability of developing
countries to participate in the OECD has resulted in the failure of the
OECD's initiative to counteract tax havens. 221 Furthermore, the OECD's
initiative has been attacked in that it violated international law due to the
intervention in other states' domestic affairs, and the OECD's lack of
legal ability to form a treaty.222
In this regard, it is argued that "[d]eveloping countries should have a
meaningful voice in any world tax body or tax convention
arrangement."223 One way for developing countries to be granted a
meaningful voice is to consider special arrangements to ensure the
reflection of their interests on the agenda, and to minimize the
dominance by largest contributors like the United States. 224
Under the circumstances, there is a strong argument to establish an
"International Tax Organization" (ITO) to enhance global tax
governance because the inability of other international organizations to
handle tax issues leads to the creation of the ITO for both developed and

of the OECD bilateral Model Treaty implies the plausibility of a multilateral treaty. Id. at 1662-1663.
Some point to the drawbacks of a bilateral treaty: As for the tax arbitrage, "the [partial and]
retrospective nature of [treaty] remedies] maximizes political opposition to changes that benefit the
government, it is always harder to take away tax benefits taxpayers believe are "theirs" than to
prevent their acquisition ab initio ... treaties are even less subject to updating and amendment than
legislation." See Roin, supra note 145, at 76-77.
220.
This OECD's efforts have been postulated in August 2001. The reported function of this
"network" would be discussions of tax matters of common interest, sharing experiences, identifying
best practices, and maintaining a widely accessible database on technical assistance activities in tax
policy and administration. See Frances M. Horner, Do we need an International Tax Organization?,
21 Tax Notes Int'I 179, 182-183 (2001); see also Technical Note, Existing Proposals for Enhanced
International Cooperation on Tax Matters, United Nations AlAe. 257/xx (Aug. 2001).
221.
Horner, supra note 220, at 181. In this regard, the designers of the OECD did not anticipate
an international governance role. The problem is that the OECD in tax function was not set up for
the kind of policy coordination it now enjoys. Id.
222.
Gilbert Morris, The Loss of Sovereignty, The United Nations, and Offshore Financial
Centers, Worldwide Tax Daily, Aug. 27,2001, available at LEXIS 2001 WTD 171-13.
223.
Horner, supra note 220. at 186.
224.
Id. (noting one possibility to reserve a few items on the agenda for developing countries,
and super-majority voting to weight developing country votes more heavily in some cases on the
other hand).
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developing countries. 225 With this understanding, a proposal, known as
the Zedillo report, for the creation of the ITO was issued as a part of the
United Nations' Financing for Department initiative in 2001. 226 The
proponents of the ITO point out that an ITO would be in a better position
to "recognize the reality of territorial and worldwide systems of taxation,
and then set forth rules such as a safe harbor for excluding exterritorial
income. "227
In response to the argument about the creation the ITO, critics assert that
an ITO would be redundant in the context of tax expertise and agenda of
the OECD. 228 Even among tax experts, there is no global consensus as to
such issues regarding "what sort of tax to levy at the corporate level and
how to relate that tax to the taxation of shareholders."229 Nor is the ITO is
likely to be created in the near future. 23o
As noted, the critical agenda is how to fill the governance gap in
taxation. Despite the criticism about the OECD's role in international
taxation, its on-going efforts at global tax governance as a global tax
network have brought a considerable attention. Here, it deserves pointing
to an empirical study on the examination of three regulatory policy
arenas, such as secUrIties regulation, competitIOn policy, and
environmental policy, in which transgovernmental networks have
arisen. 231 This study illustrates that networks play different roles in
accordance with the spectrum of regulatory power. In short, the
concentration of regulatory powers in securities regulation encourages
harmonization, and thus networks can be alternatives.
In contrast, the diffusion of regulatory powers in environmental
regulation leads to harmonization but less likely, and thus treaties fill the
gaps while networks may strengthen the compliance with treaties.

225.
See generally. id.; see also, VITO TANZI, TAXATION IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD (\995)
(arguing that globalization is pushing tax systems under substantial pressure and that the
coordinating role of the OECD "falls far short of what it needs to be on a worldwide scale .... There
is no world institution with the responsibility to establish desirable rules for taxation and with
enough clout to include countries to follow those rules. Perhaps the time has come to establish
one.").
226.
Report of the High Level Panel on Financing for Development, available at
http://www.un.orgireportS/financing [hereinafter the Zedillo Report].
227.
William M. Funk, The Thirty-Years Tax War, Tax Notes Today, Oct. 9, 2001, available at
LEXIS, Tax Analyst File.
228.
Homer, supra note 205, at 179; see also Outgoing Staffer Discusses Treaty Policy, 76 Tax
Notes 1536 (1997) (arguing that "[ilt has not proven practical to have a multilateral tax treaty").
229.
Shaviro, supra note 147, at 330.
230.
Avi-Yonah, supra note 120, at 1649.
Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Trans-governmental
231.
Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 V A. J. INT'L L. I, at 26-51,72,76 (2002).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol10/iss1/7

40

Pak: Int'l Finance & State Sovereignty

2004]

INT'L FINANCE & STATE SOVEREIGNTY

205

Meanwhile, the moderate concentration of the powers in competition
policy supports the liberal internationalism by promoting convergence in
regulatory approach.232 It is worth noting that as gap-fillers, global
networks have fostered international cooperation and facilitated global
convergence, thus enhancing the effectiveness and compliance of
treaties. 233
Likewise, an emphasis should be placed on the coordination of bilateral
tax treaty network and global tax network toward enhancing global tax
governance. In this context, a special attention should be given to fill the
governance gaps through the evolution of the OECD as a global tax
network, and participation of developing countries in the agenda rather
than the creation of an ITO as a multilateral tax treaty.
V.

CONCLUSION

Globalization has certainly influenced the power and authority of nationstates. The process of globalization transformed the Westphalia notions
of sovereignty associated with exclusive territorial jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, nation-states are, and will remain the main actors in
international economic affairs under international law.
In the meantime, global economy with new information technologies has
raised questions regarding how to characterize the function of nationstates as actors in international financial markets. Moreover, the debate
as to the framework of regulatory governance in the global economy has
been still subject to critical scrutiny.
The new system of global regulatory governance reflecting the
fragmentation and desegregation of state sovereignty stresses the active
participation of independent decentralized government agencies rather
than supranational international regimes along with regulators'
compliance with broad regulatory standards constituting international
soft law instead of direct enforcement. In this context, transgovernmentalism highlights nationalization of international law toward
the regulatory harmonization.
However, these claims are still controversial, and the subject of hot
debate even though global network governance has emerged in the
232.
See id. Raustiala argues that "the distribution of regulatory power helps account for the
presence of treaties and therefore helps explain when, and how, networks may interact with treaties."
See id. at 72.
233.
/d. at 90-92 (stating that "transgovernmental cooperation is a significant development in
international law, one more likely to supplement liberal internationalism than supplant it").
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international economy. In order for all the undeveloped and
industrialized countries to benefit from the regime of global regulatory
governance in the age of globalization, various types of realistic
measures should be taken to reduce inequalities between North and
South. Otherwise, global standards as international soft law will not be
apparently welcome to developing and transitional countries.
Under the perspective, this paper has set out some considerations
regarding the measures needed for enhancing global tax governance. At
the center of the debate over the interplay between bilateral tax treaty
network and global tax network, this paper has taken the position that the
interplay lies somewhere between liberal internationalism that
emphasizes tax treaties under international law, and transgovernmentalism stressing the primacy of global tax network as the
central actor in the international tax regime.
More importantly, the task of enhancing global tax governance requires
filling the governance gap in the international tax regime. The success of
this agenda depends largely on whether any international tax policy
forum has transparency, legitimacy and accountability. In this context,
the evolution of the OECD as a global tax network is inevitable. That is,
if the OECD still attempts to serve a useful role in global tax governance,
developing countries should be given an effective voice in the forum.
Otherwise, developing countries may find that a global tax arrangement
holds little interest, and poses some dangers.234
Meanwhile, the time has not come to establish the International Tax
Organization since the proposal for the creation still needs global
consensus from tax experts, academics, and authorities around the world.
Under the circumstances, a special attention should be paid on the
coordination of bilateral tax treaty network and global tax network.
Finally, this paper concludes in pointing to one observer's argument that
"[g]lobal governance will come not at the expense of the state but rather
as an expression of the interests that the state embodies. As the source of
order and basis of governance, the state will remain in the future as
effective, and will be essential, as it has ever been."235

234. Homer, supra note 220, at 187.
235. Martin Wolf, Will the Nation·State survive Globalization? 80 FOREIGN AFFAIRS No. I
at 190 (Jan. /Feb. 2001).
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